1 I would like to thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this problem and for helpful comments on a first draft.
Introduction
Like the parents in Garrison Keillor's Lake Woebegone, where all the children are above average, supervisors also have a tendency to judge their workers as above average, resulting in performance evaluations that are more compressed and less variable than actual performance. In this paper it is shown that such compression is a feature of the optimal contract between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent when rewards are based upon a subjective evaluation of performance. The extent to which the principal is able to reward the agent as a function of her subjective evaluation depends upon the degree to which the agent agrees with these evaluations. When the principal's and the agent's subjective evaluations concur, then one can implement the optimal contract, just as if evaluations were objective and verifiable. Conversely, when the principal's and agent's signals are uncorrelated, the optimal contract compresses evaluation into two levels -acceptable and unacceptable, with only the very worst performances receiving the unacceptable ranking. This latter result is consistent with evidence documented in Prendergast (1999) , illustrating the reluctance of supervisors to distinguish between employees, particularly when it affects compensation.
Much of the literature on incentive contracts has focussed upon the problem of designing compensation schemes based upon verifiable measures of performance. As Holmström (1979) and Harris and Raviv (1979) have shown, compensation should vary with any useful piece of information. A major caveat to this result is the work of Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) who show that one should reduce the pay-performance sensitivity in a multi-tasking environment when only one task can be measured. These results apply to jobs where objective measures of performance are available, yet as Prendergast (1999) observes, "most people don't work in jobs like these".
1 Rather, rewards such as bonuses and promotions most often depend upon the subjective evaluations provided by an individual's employer. Moreover, even when verifiable measures of output are available, subjective evaluations of performance may also affect compensation.
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Much of the literature on subjective evaluation, reviewed in the next section, uses a repeated game framework to model the structure of self-enforcing contracts when performance is not verifiable. The central insight of this literature is that a necessary condition for the existence of a self-enforcing contract is the ability of the two parties to punish each other in ways that are socially costly. In this paper the following question is addressed -assuming that individuals have an unlimited ability to punish each other, what is the 1 Prendergarst (1999), page 57. 2 See Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) on this point. Interestingly in any given year about 20% -30% of US workers receive some form of subjectively determined reward, while for most occupations only about 1% to 5% of workers report receiving performance pay in the form of commissions or piece rates. For more details see MacLeod and Parent (1999) .
structure of the optimal contract? It is assumed that assessments are imperfectly correlated, so that these punishments are carried out with positive probability. Hence, ex ante, the principal selects a contract that trades off the provision of incentives against both the insurance motive and the desire to lower the costs of contract enforcement. These enforcement costs can be naturally interpreted as a form of "conflict". It is well known among legal scholars that the threat of violence and conflict can play an important role in contract enforcement (Posner (1997) ). What is new in this paper is the derivation of the optimal level of "conflict" needed to enforce a contract based upon a subjective evaluation.
Once the optimal contract has been derived, one can then ask the implementation question, namely how does one induce the conflict needed to enforce the contract. This is an odd question for economists who are used to assuming that individuals bargain to efficient agreements, despite the ample evidence of interpersonal conflict both in organizations and society as a whole. However, as Schelling (1980) and Frank (1988) have observed, the threat of conflict can influence one's bargaining power, and thus can aid in contract enforcement. More recently Bewley (1997) has documented the perceptions of management in dealing with the employment relationship. He finds managers were uniformly concerned about the impact that wage decreases would have upon worker morale and performance, an outcome that can be interpreted as another form of "conflict" because low morale decreases the value of trade for both parties.
The fact that managers do not wish to lower wages, does not imply that they are never decreased. The analysis here suggests that the key point is the amount of correlation in beliefs between the principal and agent, and that cuts can occur if workers believe they are justified. Altonji and Devreux (1999) find some evidence consistent with this observation, namely that while it is the case that nominal wage decreases are rare, they can and do occur when a firm is in financial distress. However, if workers are not convinced that their compensation should be decreased, then the analysis here suggests that they should initiate activities which are costly to the firm, precisely the kind of behavior described in Bewley (1997) .
Individual biases can also affect the quality of a subjective evaluation, and hence the model also has some implications for the theory of discrimination. The traditional theory, as reviewed in Altonji and Blank (1999) , models the economic impact of discrimination in terms of its effect on earnings. That is individuals from a discriminated against group earn less than equally able members from a non-discriminated against group. The analysis here suggests that this relationship is more complex. In particular more able individuals in the discriminated against group might suffer more than other members of the same group if they are more aware of the discrimination. Formally discrimination arises when the subjective evaluation of an individual's performance is biased downwards. However, the cost of implementing a performance contract given this bias is a function of the correlation in beliefs, not the bias itself. If a more able individual is more likely to disagree with the principal's evaluation than an individual with less ability from the same group then earnings and performance may be lower for the higher ability individual. This result may help explain the finding of Siegelman (1991, 2001) , that during periods of falling measured discrimination, the number of law suits filed under title VII of the Civil Rights Act has increased, particularly among well educated individuals.
The agenda of the paper is as follows. The next section provides an overview of the relevant literature, followed by an introduction of the basic principal agent model. Section 3 provides an analysis of the optimal contract with subjective evaluation and then in section 4 a discussion of the implications of the model for the theory of discrimination is given. Section 5 presents sufficient conditions under which the optimal contract can be implemented in a repeated relationship and demonstrates why in general efficiency wage contracts are not efficient. Section 6 contains a concluding discussion.
Background Literature
The previous theoretical literature on subjective compensation can be roughly divided into two strands. The first is based upon an extension of the repeated prisoner's dilemma problem to model a repeated interaction between a risk neutral principal and a risk neutral agent. The agent decides whether to work hard or not, which results in a non-verifiable signal of performance that both the principal and agent observe. As MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) show, the equilibria in this game take one of two forms. In the "efficiency wage" version, the agent receives a fixed wage that is higher than the market alternative, and the principal fires the worker if and only if performance is low. 3 Given that the wage bill does not vary with the principal's decision, then she has an incentive to truthfully reveal her evaluation.
The second class of equilibria correspond to "bonus pay" contracts. In this case the agent earns her market alternative, and the principal pays a bonus whenever the output is perceived to be high. Given that performance is not verifiable, the principal has an incentive to claim that performance is inadequate. In equilibrium, the contract is made self-enforcing by requiring the agent to quit and impose a cost on the firm should the bonus pay be inadequate. In both cases the existence of a non-trivial self-enforcing contract depends upon the value of the relationship being strictly greater than the next best alternatives for the two parties, which in turn implies that neither class of equilibria are consistent with a competitive equilibrium in the labor market. The major insight of this strand of the literature is that the existence of a self-enforcing contract with subjective evaluation entails the creation of rents that are lost whenever one party deviates from agreed upon behavior.
There are a number of ways that such a rent can be generated, including unemployment as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or firm reputation as in Bull (1987) and Kreps (1990) . In addition, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) in the case of a risk neutral agent, and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) in the case of a risk averse agent, have more generally shown that implicit contracts based upon subjective evaluations can improve upon the set of feasible allocations that arise when individuals are restricted to using contracts based upon verifiable measures of performance alone. However, a common feature of these papers is the assumption that the both the principal and agent observe the same non-verifiable signal, a hypothesis that greatly simplifies the analysis, but is not consistent with a central feature of subjective evaluation, namely that the evaluation of the same performance is likely to differ, sometimes very significantly, among different individuals.
This diversity in evaluations can be formally modelled by assuming the principal and agent each receive a different non-verifiable private signal that is positively correlated with the agent's performance. Jonathan Levin (2000) extends the model of MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) to this case and shows that the simple bonus pay contract is optimal, a result that follows from the fact that the agent is risk neutral, and which does not differ in structure from the optimal contract with verifiable information. 4 The distinguishing feature of subjective evaluation relative to the case of verifiable information is that the provision of incentives requires there to be inefficient separations in some cases, with the size of the inefficiency limited by the worst punishments that one can inflict in the repeated game. Given these punishments, Levin (2000) shows that the optimal contract can be found as the solution to a one period principal-agent problem with constraints upon the possible side payments, a result that plays an important role in this paper.
A second strand of the literature is the work of Prendergast (1993) and Prendergast and Topel (1996) , which explores the impact of subjective evaluation for the design of incentives in an organization. Prendergast (1993) explores a model with risk neutral principal and agent, who both observed the productivity of a project. The agent's effort determines the quality of the signal she receives, which she then reports, possibly untruthfully, to the principal. Compensation is a function of the difference between her report and the principal's observation. The main result is that there is a trade-off between providing effort incentives and obtain truthful reporting of information. Prendergast and Topel (1996) extend this model to a three level hierarchy consisting of a principal, supervisor and agent. The supervisor sends her subjective evaluation of the agent to the principal, who then decides upon compensation for the agent, and, as in the Prendergast 4 When the agent is risk neutral then in the case of verifiable information there are many optimal contracts, including contracts that take the form of simple bonus pay. The hypothesis of a risk averse agent is necessary in order to make a unique prediction regarding the form of the optimal contract.
(1993), rewards the supervisor as a function of the difference between the supervisor's report and the principal's subjective assessment of agent performance. In addition to the pecuniary rewards, the supervisor is also motivated by the "favors" she provides to the agent. The principal may improve the performance of a performance pay contract by giving the supervisor more discretion over decision making due to the value she derives from exercising her favoritism.
Both Prendergast (1993) and Prendergast and Topel (1996) are concerned with the problem of how subjectivity leads to distortions in the reported evaluation, but do not derive the optimal reward mechanism for the revelation of subjective information. Moreover, it is assumed that the principal is able to set compensation for the agent/supervisor as a function of the difference in their subjective evaluations, without incorporating the costs required to implement such a scheme. This paper builds upon the results of Levin (2000) who shows that the optimal contract with subjective evaluation is the solution to a one period principal agent problem with the addition of new constraints that arise from the subjective nature of evaluations.
In his paper the agent is assumed to be risk neutral, an assumption that is relaxed in this paper.
The Model
Consider a principal who offers a one period employment contract to an agent. If the agent accepts the contract, then she chooses effort¸2 [0; 1] ; where¸is the probability that a benefit B is realized. The net benefit to the principal is:
where W are the dollar costs of employing the agent. The agent is risk averse, with preferences U .c;¸/ satisfying the following assumption:
Assumption A: The Bernoulli utility function of the agent satisfies U .c;¸/ D u .c/ ¡ V .¸/ ; where c > 0;
It is assumed that the agent is risk averse, and that it is not possible for the agent to produce the benefit B with probability 1. If the agent rejects the contract offer, she is assumed to have a market opportunity yielding an expected utility of N u: It is also assumed that B is not directly observable, rather it corresponds to a complex good or service whose ultimate quality is difficult to determine. For example B may be the return on a film that becomes a blockbuster; even though many individuals contribute to the success of the film (the secretaries, technicians etc.), except for some of the principals in the project, their compensation typically depends upon their perceived contribution to the project at the time their services are performed.
The model can also be interpreted as commercial contract between two firms, P and A, in which firm A supplies a service or good for firm P's production process, such as the design of some new manufacturing equipment. In this case the effort of firm A affects the probability that the new good produced by firm P is a success. In many, if not most cases, subcontractors, such as firm A, are not likely to be directly compensated as a function of the success of the final product.
Rather than observe whether or not B has been (or will be) realized, the principal observes a measure of performance t 2 f1; :::; ng : The probability of t given the outcome is/will be a success is°H t ; while if it is not/will not be a success with probability°L t : Let°k D £°k 1 ; ::;°k t ; ::;°k n ¤ T be the vector of probabilities when the performance is a success
As a matter of convention the signals are indexed such that°H tC1 >°H t > 0 for all t D 1; ::; n ¡ 1: Given effort¸; the probability of observing signal t is given by°t .¸/ D¸°H t C.1 ¡¸/°L t ; with°.¸/ D¸°H C.1 ¡¸/°L denoting the corresponding vector of probabilities. Notice that for¸> 0; all signals occur with positive probability, and hence the standard full support assumption is satisfied in this model. In order for a higher signal to unambiguously imply that it is more likely that a good outcome has occurred or will occur, the monotone likelihood ratio condition is assumed to hold.
When the signals are observable and contractible, this model is a standard principal-agent problem (Ross (1973) , Harris and Raviv (1979) and Holmström (1979) ). The agent's contract is given by the vector of payments for each signal: c D [c 1 ; :::; c t ; :::; c n ] T 2 < n C ; where c t is the agent's consumption in state t: The model satisfies the basic conditions for the principal-agent problem studied in Grossman and Hart (1983) . They show that one can decompose the problem into two steps. First one determines the cost of eliciting a level of effort¸; denoted C ¤ .¸/ ; and then one can solve max¸2
The focus of this paper is upon the structure of the optimal contract to produce effort¸; when the principal uses subjective measures of performance. The optimal contract is the one which elicits effort¸at the lowest cost C ¤ .¸/, and solves:
where
T is the vector of state contingent utilities, and°.¸/ D¸°H C .1 ¡¸/°L is the vector of probabilities for each signal t: Constraint 2 is the individual rationality constraint, while 3 is the incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that the agent has an incentive to select¸: As is standard in this literature, it is assumed that where several solutions to 3 exist, the agent selects the effort desired by the principal. As a matter of convention if there is no contract implementing¸; then C ¤ .¸/ D 1: Grossman and Hart (1983) have shown that assumptions A and B ensure a solution to this problem exists. In the absence of the incentive constraint 3, given that the agent is risk averse implies that the optimal contract is to pay a fixed wage, c t D w that satisfies u .w/ D N u C V .¸/ : From this we conclude that the first best cost of implementing effort¸is
and hence first best effort is the solution to:
However, if effort is not observable, and the agent is paid an income that is independent of performance, then she will set effort at the lowest possible level,¸D 0: To induce effort, the optimal contract entails compensation that is a function of the signal t: Holmström (1979) has shown that the extent to which consumption varies with t depends upon the quality of the signal, a result summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given assumptions A and B; then for¸2 [0; 1/; 1 > C ¤ .¸/ > 0; and the associated optimal contract, c ¤ ; has the property that c Proof. For¸D 0; the optimal contract is clearly c t D u ¡1 . N u/ > 0 for t 2 T: For¸2 .0; 1/ ; the convexity of V implies the I C constraint is equivalent to:
Given the MLRP, assumption B; there always exists a c satisfying 4. Simply let c t D N c for°H t ¡°L t¸0
(some of which are strictly positive since the distributions are not the same), and c t D f . N c/ when°H t ¡°L t < 0; where f . N c/ is set sufficiently close to zero such that 4 is satisfied with equality. Notice that
and hence one can then choose N c so that the individual rationality constraint 3 is satisfied with equality. Finally, from Bertsekas (1974) , and the fact that u .¢/ is concave, lim c!0 u .c/ D ¡1 and lim c!1 u .c/ D 1;
it follows that the variance of solutions to 2 and 3 is bounded, and given the finite support for consumption, the set of feasible consumption contracts satisfying these constraints form a compact set. Hence C ¤ .¸/ exists for every¸2 .0; 1/ :
Let ¹ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the individual rationality constraint 2, and ¹ 1 the Lagrange multiplier associated with the first order condition, then from Holmström (1979) the multipliers are strictly positive (¹ 0 ; ¹ 1 > 0) and the optimal contract solves:
Letting r t D°H t =°L t be the likelihood ratio, observe .°H t ¡°L t /°t
; from which it follows that the monotone likelihood ratio condition implies that
This combined with ¹ 1 > 0 and the strict concavity of u implies that c t is strictly increasing in t:
Increasing effort increases the likelihood of a high signal, and consequently the individual's pay increases with t: Notice that risk aversion plays an important role for this result. If the agent were risk neutral then there would exist many optimal contracts, because one can increase the risk to improve incentives, and as long as the expected income does not change, then the utility of the agent remains unchanged. For example the agent can be paid a flat wage w for t > 1; and paid w ¡ P when t D 1: In this case for any¸, P is chosen to satisfy:
and then w can be set to satisfy the individual rationality constraint. This point illustrates why the introduction of risk aversion is a necessary ingredient to study the phenomena of compressed performance evaluations.
It follows from the arguments of Grossman and Hart (1983) that C ¤ .¸/ is lower semi-continuous and hence there is an optimal effort,¸¤; solving:
In general the convexity of V .¢/ implies that the optimal effort level rises with B:
The Optimal Contract with Subjective Evaluation
Most performance evaluations are at least partially subjective, whether it is in an employment context, or for a commercial contract that entails the receipt of goods or services. Typically the principal has a right to observe performance or inspect goods and then decide if the quality is appropriate. However, while the principal may have a definite opinion regarding the quality of performance, it may be quite difficult to provide a corresponding objective measure that is both sufficiently precise and enforceable by contract. For example, consider the quality of a research report, a work of art, or food prepared by a chef. In some cases, such as with food or a service, the quality of the good is not even stable over time, and hence even if the owner of a restaurant is certain that food quality is low, preserving the evidence such as poor food for the purposes of contract enforcement may be impossible.
Even though performance may not be contractible, the subjective evaluation of performance is not arbitrary because good evaluations are likely to be highly correlated between individuals. This section explores the implications of such correlation for optimal contract design with subjective evaluation. Specifically, suppose that after the principal observes t; then the agent makes her personal evaluation of her own performance, denoted s 2 T: If s provides additional information regarding performance¸; then, as Holmström (1979) has shown, the optimal contract should incorporate this information (see also Prendergast (1993) who explicitly considers this trade-off for the problem of project choice). To focus upon the role that s can play in enforcing an optimal contract it is assumed that the likelihood of a particular s occurring is a function of t: One way to think about this hypothesis is that once the good or service has been produced, the principal and agent observe it together, though the agent has only an imperfect estimate of the principal's evaluation.
As before, let°H t and°L t denote the probability that the principal observes signal t when performance is respectively H and L: The agent's probability of observing s conditional upon the principal observing t is P ts D Pr fsjtg : If evaluations are perfectly correlated then:
while if the agent's signal has no information regarding the principal's evaluation then P ts D PN ts ; for all t; N t; s 2 T: It shall be assumed that if t occurs, then s D t has a positive probability of occurring:
Assumption C For all t 2 T; P tt > 0:
The probability of the pair st occurring in states H and L is 0 H ts D P ts°H t and 0 L ts D P ts°L t ; respectively. Given the effort¸by the agent, the ex ante unconditional probability of state ts is:
This information structure explicitly supposes that the judgement of the principal is superior to that of the agent, and hence even if t and s were both observable, the optimal contract would depend upon t alone.
Therefore, the analysis focuses upon the role that signal s plays in providing the appropriate incentives for the principal to reveal his information.
The revelation principle is invoked to characterize the optimal contract. Without loss of generality it is assumed that at the end of the period the principal and agent report their subjective evaluations to a third party, who then implements the contract C D fc ts ; w ts g t;s2T 2 < 2n 2 ; where c ts is the consumption of the agent in state ts; while w st is the wage paid by the principal in state ts: The program for the optimal contract consists of adding the incentive constraints for the revelation of subjective information to the principal-agent problem with complete contracts:
2 arg max
The new constraints for this program are 9 to 11. Constraint 9 requires that the principal's costs be lowest when he reports his true type. Expected cost conditional upon t is P s2T w ts 0 ts .¸/ = P s2T 0 ts .¸/ : If P s2T 0 ts .¸/ 6 D 0; then this cancels on both sides, while if P s2T 0 ts .¸/ D 0; then 0 ts .¸/ D 0 for s 2 T; and hence the inequality is automatically satisfied.
Similarly constraint 10 requires the agent to weakly prefer to report s truthfully. Finally, constraint 11 requires that the consumption of the agent is less than or equal to the payment of the principal. One would normally suppose that the wage payment is equal to consumption, w ts D c ts ; however in this case it would be impossible to elicit any effort:
Proposition 2 Suppose that c ts D w ts for all t; s 2 T; then for¸> 0;the cost of effort is undefined, and hence the only possible solution entails no effort (¸D 0), and a fixed wage contract
Proof. If c ts D w ts then after making their subjective evaluations, the principal and agent are play a constant-sum game when making their reports. From the min-max theorem such a game has a unique value and hence the agent's compensation cannot depend upon t: From the incentive constraint it follows that the agent exerts no effort, and if employed is paid a fixed wage N w.
Therefore in this principal agent model it is impossible to elicit subjective information under the hypothesis that the contract is budget balancing. This result is well known, and was first demonstrated in the context of dominant strategy equilibria by Groves and Ledyard (1977) and Holmström (1978) . When the budget balancing is relaxed it is straightforward to establish the existence of a contract implementing
¤ is a consumption contract implementing¸in the absence of subjective evaluation, then the contract c ts D c ¤ t and w ts D max t2T c ¤ t D w; for all t; s 2 T , satisfies the constraints 7 to 11. Under this contract, the report of the principal does not affect her wage payment, w; while the agent's information is ignored. Formally, this can be achieved by having the principal pay the difference w ¡ c ¤ t to a third party, however this is not the only mechanism available. There is a literature that discusses various institutions that allow one to relax the budget balancing constraint. A more detailed discussion is given in section 5. The reason for not explicitly addressing the issue at this point is because it introduces additional complexity that would obfuscate the role of subjective evaluation for optimal contracting. The next proposition establishes the basic existence and characterization of the optimal contract.
Proposition 3 Given Assumptions A and B, then for all¸2 [0; 1/;there is a cost minimizing contract,
; implementing effort¸, with the property that c
Proof. Notice that given c ¤ ts the agent's incentive constraint satisfies:
Given that the agent is risk averse there exists a O c t · P s2T c ¤ ts P ts such that u
Notice that if the agent is paid O c t in each state, then her report s does not affect her payoff, and thus constraint 10 is automatically satisfied.
Let us now show that the optimal contract must necessarily have the property that the agent's compensation does not depend upon s: If it did then for some t it must be the case that O c t < P s2T c ¤ ts P ts : Let 1 ts D c ts ¡ O c t ; which from the previous inequality must solve P s2T 1 ts P ts¸0 ; with strict inequality for some t: One can ensure that under this new contract 11 is satisfied by setting:
The difficulty now is that whenever P s2T 1 ts P ts > 0; the wage payment in state t is reduced, and hence the principal's incentive constraint may no longer be binding, which can be restored by increasing the wage payments when t occurs by P s2T 1 ts P ts ; so that the wage payment is:
Thus we have shown that given any optimal contract, we can always find another which gives the same payoff to both the principal and agent, and entails c ts D c t N s for all t; s; N s 2 T: If it is the case that P s2T 1 ts P ts > 0 for all t; then the transformation can be made strictly Pareto improving, with the firm offering a lower wage in every state, while leaving the agent no worse off.
Since w ts¸ct¸0 ; we can define 1 ts D w ts ¡ c t ; and replace the constraint on w ts by 1 ts¸0 : Notice that 1 ts is a measure of the social loss. In this case the cost of implementing¸; C S .¸/ solves:
.
From the proof of proposition 1, the set of contracts satisfying 18 and 17 with equality is non-empty and one can at no cost set 1N ts sufficiently large that the constraint:
is not binding whenever 0 ts .¸/ > 0: Given these values for 1N ts ; the remaining values of c t and 1 ts solve an optimization problem with a continuous objective function, and compact parameter space, and hence a solution exists.
This proposition establishes the existence of an optimal contract implementing effort¸: From the arguments of Grossman and Hart (1983) it also follows that C S .¸/ is lower semi-continuous and hence an optimum to the principal-agent problem with subjective evaluation exists and is the solution to:
The deadweight loss from using subjective evaluation is given by the term P t;s2T 1 ts 0 ts .¸/ : Given that the use of subjective evaluation entails the addition of constraints to the principal's cost minimization problem, one can immediately conclude that
C denote the effort and contract combinations, ©¸; fc t ; w ts g t;s2T ª ; that implement¸and satisfy the incentive constraints as a function of the default utility for the agent. Let P ¤ . N u/ ½ P . N u/ denote the set of effort levels and contract that achieve this at the lowest cost. The next two sections study the structure of P ¤ . N u/ as a function of beliefs.
Perfect Correlation
Consider first the case of perfect correlation between the principal's and agent's beliefs regarding their assessments. In that case P ts D I ts´( 1; if t D s; 0; if not. ; and it is straightforward to show that one can implement the optimal complete contract.
Proposition 4
If the principal's and agent's signals are perfectly correlated, then the incentive constraints, 9 and 10 are not binding, hence the optimal contract with subjective evaluation is the same as the optimal principal-agent contract with verifiable information.
Proof. Let © c ¤ t ª be the optimal complete contract, and set w ¤ tt D c ¤ t ; and for t 6 D s set w ¤ ts D max t2T c ¤ t C k; where k > 0: From proposition 1 we know that the agent automatically satisfies her incentive constraints.
The cost to the principal who reports t 0 ; given that he has observed t is:
Clearly, C .tjt/ < C ¡ t 0 jt ¢ for t 0 6 D t; and hence the principal always has an incentive to report truthfully, and thus this contract results in the optimal complete contract with no welfare loss due to the incentive constraints arising from subjective evaluation.
This result highlights the fact that under the hypothesis that the budget balancing condition is only weakly satisfied, then the subjective nature of assessments by itself does not imply inefficiency. As long as individuals can agree upon whether performance is acceptable or not, then it is possible to write an efficient contract. In practice one would never expect perfect agreement and hence it is important to know if this result is approximately correct when beliefs are highly, but not perfectly, correlated. To address this question consider a sequence of beliefs, P Proof. Given that P ts D 0 for t 6 D s; the constraint set is not compact, and hence Berge's maximum theorem cannot be applied directly here. From the individual rationality constraint and Bertsekas (1974) it follows that the consumption set is bounded, and hence compact. Therefore there exists a subsequence k 0 ;
such that c k ts ; converges to say c 0 ts : Since C ¤ .¸/ · C S .¸/ for any set of beliefs, it must be the case that
Given that the probability P k ts approaches zero when t 6 D s; it is not possible to guarantee that w k ts is a bounded sequence. Rather, we shall show that costs must be bounded by a contract O A k with the property that the associated costs function
and we will be done.
The optimal contract under perfect correlation has a unique consumption contract, c ¤ t ; with wage payments satisfying w ¤ tt D c ¤ t : Select w ¤ ts when t 6 D s to be sufficiently large that the incentive constraint 9 is satisfied with strict inequality. Given lim n!1 P k ts D I ts ; this implies that there is an N such that for all k > N; 9 is satisfied, and hence the optimal contract is feasible for k > N: Let C k .¸/ be the corresponding costs. By construction, it has the property that lim k!1 C k .¸/ D C ¤ .¸/ ; and we are done.
This result demonstrates that when beliefs are highly correlated then the optimal consumption is close to the contract predicted in the standard principal agent model, and that the expected social loss will be close to zero. Unfortunately, the social loss when t 6 D s (which occurs with low probability) cannot be uniformly bounded, and hence even though beliefs are highly correlated, one cannot conclude that ex post the social loss in some states will not be very large.
No Correlation in Subjective Assessments
Suppose now that the agent's signal entails no information regarding the principal's evaluation, that is P ts D P ts for all t; s; s0 2 T: In this case making the payments, w ts ; depend upon s does not relax the incentive constraints, and hence without loss of generality we may set w ts D w t , for all s 2 T: In this case the incentive constraint for the principal observing signal t is:
.w t ¡ wN t /°t .¸/ · 0; 8t; N t 2 T; from which one concludes that w t D wN t´w ; for t; N t 2 T . Hence the optimal contract entails the principal facing costs that are independent of her subjective assessment. Notice that the optimal consumption contract with objective performance measures, c ¤ ; is feasible in this case by letting w D max t2T c ¤ t : Thus, the principal could, should she choose, provide the agent with the optimal consumption contract. Hence, a pooling of evaluations is not a necessary consequence of subjective evaluation, rather it is the result of trading off the gains from high power incentives against the cost of using subjective evaluations. The next proposition demonstrates that the optimal contract in this case entails at most two performance levels.
Proposition 6 Given Assumptions A and B the optimal contract implementing effort¸based upon the principal's subjective evaluations entails wage payments that do not depend upon the principal's evaluation: w t D w for all t 2 T , while the agent receives:
where t D 1 corresponds to the lowest performance level. Let°H g D P n tD2°H t ; and similarly for°L g ; then w and P are the unique solutions to:
Costs are given by:
The discussion preceding the proposition demonstrates w t D wN t´w ; for t; N t 2 T: The optimal contract is therefore a solution to:
w ¡ c t¸0 ; t 2 T:
Let ¹ 0 ; ¹ 1 and¯t be the multipliers for constraints 26, 27 and 28, and hence the Lagrangian for the optimization problem is:
To simplify the calculation constraint 28 is replaced by°t .¸/ .w ¡ c t /¸0: The first order conditions for
Suppose that the last constraint is not binding, that is w > c t ; then the complementary slackness condition implies ¹ t D 0; which combined with @ L=@c t D 0 implies:
In the absence of the incentive constraint, a fixed wage contract would be offered, implying
and therefore 27 can be replaced by the inequality X
and hence ¹ 1 > 0 whenever¸> 0: Now from the monotone likelihood condition it follows that 32 can be true for at most one performance level t 0 : For the other performance levels w D c t and one has:
Again, given that ¹ t > 0 and the monotone likelihood ratio conditions implies that t 0 must be the lowest performance level. Therefore the optimal contract takes the form:
Using°k g ; k D H; L; as defined in the statement of the proposition, the incentive constraint implies:
from which 23 follows, while the individual rationality constraint implies 24. Levin (2000) has shown that in the risk neutral context the optimal contract takes a two step form, though
in that case such a contract would also be efficient with a contractible performance measure. This result demonstrates even though a consumption contract which does not entail pooling is feasible, the optimal contract nevertheless entails a pooling of performance evaluations into two levels, high and low. Moreover, this contract is close to optimal when the agent's evaluations are very weakly correlated with the principal's, as demonstrated in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose assumptions A and B are satisfied. Consider a sequence of beliefs P k ts ! P ts ; where P ts > 0 for all ts 2 T £ T: Then for¸2 [0; 1/; the optimal cost function converges, C k .¸/ ! C .¸/ ; and the limit points of the optimal contract, c k t ; are optimal for the beliefs P ts :
Proof. From assumptions A and B, we know that C k .¸/ and C .¸/ are bounded for¸< 1; which combined with Bertsekas (1974) implies that c t can be assumed to lie in a compact set. Given that P ts > 0; one can choose an N such that P k ts¸" > 0 for all k > N; and for all ts 2 T £ T: This, combined with the fact that consumption must lie in a compact set also implies that w st can be assumed to lie in a compact set (which is what differentiates this case from the earlier case with perfect correlation). Given that the constraints are continuous in P ts ; Berge's maximum theorem implies the statement of the proposition.
With a small amount of correlation we can expect in general that consumption varies with the signal of performance, or that c t 6 D cN t for t 6 D N t: However, this approximation result implies that when the correlation between the principal's and agent's beliefs is low then compensation is low at the lowest performance level, and approximately constant for higher levels of performance.
The Effect of Bias and Discrimination
The analysis thus far illustrates that the efficiency of subjective evaluation systems depends upon the correlation in beliefs between the principal and agent. When this correlation is weak evaluations are more compressed, and there is necessarily a social loss associated with the use of subjective evaluation arising when the principal and agent disagree regarding performance. Given that subjective beliefs are explicitly modelled, then it is possible to formally study the implication of bias and discrimination for the optimal contract (and here by "optimal" I do not mean socially optimal, but rather the contract that a profit maximizing principal who discriminates would chose). The two questions I wish to address in this section are first how does discrimination affect performance, and secondly how does it affect the level of conflict? In particular it is shown that given two equally productive individuals, if the principal has more pessimistic beliefs concerning the performance of one versus the other, then both compensation and the performance of the discriminated-against agent will be lower.
Bias in decision making can affect labor market outcomes in a number of ways, including through wage levels, the hiring decision and task assignment (see Altonji and Blank (1999) for a comprehensive survey).
With regard to bias in the evaluation of performance Goldin and Rouse (2000) finds that when evaluators for orchestral positions could not observe the sex of the applicant (a screen was put up shielding the applicant, so only the sound could be heard), the number of women who were hired significantly increased. There is also some evidence that the bias is greater when performance evaluation is more subjective. Kahn (1991) finds that there is evidence of discrimination against French Canadian defense men on hockey teams, a position for which it is difficult to measure performance. There did not appear to be any discrimination against
French Canadians when they were in positions such as forwards where productivity in terms of goals scored can be more easily measured.
To explore the effect of this type of bias consider the problem of contracting with two levels of performance: T D fA; U g ; where A denotes acceptable performance, and U denotes unacceptable performance. For simplicity suppose that if the low outcome occurs, the principal knows this for sure, and hence°L and then a good outcome occurs. The principal is biased against F if°M
is the probability of a good signal given a high outcome for person i 2 fM; F g : The question then is how does an increase in bias (a decrease in°H A / affect the optimal contract?
The answer, as we have seen, depends upon the agent's self-evaluation or more precisely how the agent believes the principal will evaluate her performance. These parameters are
and
The parameter ½ S represents the extent to which the agent's self recognition of good performance is consistent with the principal's. If this is low, then the agent is likely to believe that she has performed poorly even though the principal believes performance is acceptable. The parameter ½ C represents the extent the agent feels that she has done a good job, even though the principal has judged the work to be unacceptable. The assessments by the principal and agent are correlated whenever ½ S > ½ C ; an assumption that shall be maintained throughout this discussion. Define the correlation ratio
representing the extent to which the principle and the agent have similar beliefs regarding performance, with larger values of ½ corresponding to a higher correlation in beliefs between the principal and agent. The next proposition presents the optimal contract for this simplified model.
Proposition 8
Given assumptions A and B; and ½ S > ½ C ; then the optimal contract implementing effortḩ as the form:
where c H and c L are the unique solutions to:°H
The cost function is given by:
where Proof. From proposition 3 it follows that the agent is given a contract of the form fc H ; c L g ;which must solve the 37 and 36. From assumption A it follows that there is a unique solution to these equations with c H > c L whenever¸> 0: Given this consumption pattern, it follows that the principal has an incentive to report U;and therefore it follows that the optimal contract takes the form w As D c H ;while w Us D c L C 1 Us ;where for at least one s it must be the case that 1 Us > 0: These premia are chosen to minimize the costs of disagreement, and hence solve:
subject to :
The objective function is the deadweight loss due to the use of subjective evaluation, while the first inequality is the condition the principal who judges the performance is acceptable does not wish to report that it is unacceptable. Given ½ S > ½ C ; it follows that the optimal solution entails 1 UU D 0; and hence
The probability that the principal pays this cost is ¡ 1 ¡¸°H A ¢ ½ C ; from which the cost term is derived.
Given that the difference between the high and low consumption levels are used to generate incentives, then risk aversion does not play an essential role for the structure of the optimal contract in this case, and hence the analysis can be simplified by supposing that the agent is risk neutral, with u .c/ D c. In this case the costs are given by:
where the first term is the cost of implementing effort¸with complete contracts, while the second term is the cost of using subjective evaluation. Thus the optimal effort is given by:
Assuming an interior optimum exists, then decreasing discrimination unambiguously increases both performance and income, while the effect of the confidence ratio is ambiguous:
Proposition 9 The optimal level of effort and agent income is increasing with a decrease in discrimination, while increasing the confidence ratio increases performance if and only if
; which is equal to B at the optimum. Moreover, the differentiability of costs and the assumption of an interior solution imply that the second order condition is satisfied and thus @ 2 C S .¸/ =@¸@¸> 0: Hence
In the case of the confidence ratio:
from which the statement of the proposition follows.
The effect of confidence upon performance is ambiguous, and depends upon both the shape of the effort cost function, and upon the level of effort and discrimination. In particular, when discrimination is sufficiently large, i.e.°H A is sufficiently small then this condition can always be satisfied if V 00 .0/ > 0:
Regardless of the effect on the marginal costs of effort, decreasing this ratio unambiguously increases the costs arising from the use of subjective measures of performance.
In particular these costs can increase even if a decrease in ½ is accompanied by a decrease in discrimination. Specifically, in the context of the previous example where the principal discriminates against F in favor of M: If the confidence ratio is the same for both individuals then the level of effort and income of M will be higher than F: However, if ½ F is sufficiently larger than ½ M then the relationship can be reversed, namely the wages and effort of F , the discriminated against individuals, may be greater than for M: This effect illustrates the effect of discrimination depends upon the belief of both the principal and agent. It may also explain in part a puzzle described in Siegelman(1991, 2001) ). They find that the number of discrimination cases filed under title VII of the 1962 Civil Rights Act increased during a period when one would expect discrimination to decrease. The analysis here illustrates that the likelihood of conflict depends upon both the amount of overt discrimination, and the extent to which the agent acquiesces to this discrimination. It is completely plausible that even though actual discrimination decreases, an increased awareness of these issues leads employees to be less willing to accept what might be viewed as unfair evaluations of performance.
This result is particularly striking if one considers the effect of ability. In the context of this model a parsimonious way to model ability is to let the disutility of effort be V .¸/ =µ; where µ > 0 represents ability. More able individuals are able to work harder and hence have higher performance and income. In this case the cost of effort¸with subjective evaluation is:
Given that V 00 > 0; then it is clear that even if person F is more able that person M;
; then the cost of employing F will be greater than M; and hence both the performance and pay of person F will be less than person M:
In other words, pay and performance depend not only upon ability but also upon the agent's beliefs regarding the quality of a principal's subjective evaluation. More generally, the model predicts that individuals who are pessimistic regarding their own performance will have lower wages and performance compared to individuals who have a more optimistic view of their own performance.
Relational Contracting
It has been assumed that the contract structure as a function of subjective evaluations is determined under the assumption that it is possible to impose costs on either the agent or the principal. When the role of the agent's signal is merely to confirm the quality and truthfulness of the principal's evaluation, then the optimal contract has the feature that the principal pays a cost whenever there is a disagreement regarding the evaluation. This approach allows one to derive the optimal contract under the assumption that the principal and agent face no constraints upon the level of socially wasteful costs that might occur during the execution of the contract (of course these costs are only wasteful ex post -when they form part of an optimal contract they are efficient ex ante).
The purpose of this section is to show how the optimal contract can be embedded into a repeated relationship where it can form part of a (Markov) perfect Nash equilibrium, and where under the appropriate conditions the outlay of the principal (w ts ) is equal to the agent's consumption (c t ). In that case the costs of enforcement arise from an endogenous separation decision initiated by the agent. The results here depend upon the previous work by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin (2000) who extend the basic repeated prisoner's dilemma problem to incorporate contracts. Specifically, I follow Levin (2000) , and suppose that the actions in period ¿ depend only upon information generated during that period. Suppose that each period the relationship proceeds as follows:
1. The agent selects effort¸¿ :
2. The principal observes performance measure t and reports O t to implement payment c O t :
3. The agent observes the report O t; and her self-assessment s; which she reports.
4. The principal and agent simultaneously decide whether to continue the relationship or not.
This extensive form is slightly different, but informed by the analysis of the static contract. At the optimal contract the agent's signal does not affect compensation, and hence learning the principal's report t does not affect her incentives to reveal her information. This extensive form more closely models our intuition regarding behavior in such a relationship, namely the principal decides upon compensation, and then the agent decides if it is "fair" or not. As MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) observe, the economic concept of a contract entails both the agreed payments and behavior of the agents, as given by their reporting strategies and termination decisions. Given that it is assumed that actions within the period depend only upon current state variables, then the contract needs only specify outcomes as a function of decisions within the period. Hence, the contract is formally: ; where t; s 2 T are reports regarding the signals observed by the principal and agent in period t. Here ® ts is the probability that the agent chooses to stay, given her type s and the report t of the principal, whilē ts is the corresponding probability the principal continues to employ the agent given the reported types. In equilibrium the principal and agent truthfully report their signal, and choose the separation probability specified in the contract. If separation occurs the principal has a default profit of zero each period; while the agent's default flow utility each period is N u: Hence the equilibrium payoffs to the principal and agent under this contract at date ¿ are recursively defined by:
Payoffs are expressed in terms of flows to simplify the comparison of the equilibria in this game with the static contract. As in Levin (2000) , it is assumed that individuals play Markov perfect strategies, that is each period they choose their actions optimally given the information for the current period. This greatly simplifies the analysis, and allows one to define the equilibrium with a set of incentive constraints:
Definition 10 A contract C is said to be self-enforcing if for every ¿ D 0; 1; 2::;and for all s; O s; t; O t 2 T :
¿ ts 2 arg max
w ts¸ct ; for all t; s 2 T:
If in addition the contract is budget balancing, that is w ts D c t for all t; s 2 T; then it is called a balanced self-enforcing contract.
to implement the optimal contract. The reason is that in addition to the threat of termination, there are a number of other social institutions whose role is to generate costs to individuals who breach implicit agreements. Bull (1987) and Kreps (1990) suppose that the principal may have different unobserved types, and that good performance is ensured by the desire to build a reputation for honesty and reliability. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) show that the performance of termination contracts can be improved with the addition of contracts that use verifiable measures of performance that increase the value of the relationship to the principal, and hence increase the costs of termination to the principal. Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) show that the institution of gift giving can also play a similar role since gifts increase the cost of new relationships, and hence increase the cost of termination. More informally, authors such as Akerlof (1982) and Bewley (1997) have explored the sociological aspects of the employment relationship, and have emphasized the fact that employees have the potential to impose costs upon their employers if they feel unfairly treated.
The analysis here demonstrates that costs are likely to be higher in an environment that combines subjective evaluation that implement high power incentives and a lack of agreement between contracting parties regarding what constitutes appropriate performance. Moreover, norms of fairness that result in retaliation against an employer can be part of an efficient contract when subjective evaluations are the best method for evaluating performance. 5 However, an interesting implication of the analysis is that efficiency wage contracts, as described in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , are not in general efficient, which also has some implications for employment law.
Efficiency Wage Contracts and At-Will Employment
Efficiency wages have often been cited as one of the explanations for the existence of inter-industry wage differentials (Krueger and Summers (1988) ), though the evidence is rather indirect. An efficiency wage contract is one in which the principal employs an agent at a fixed wage, and if performance is judged unsatisfactory the relationship is terminated. It is assumed that this agent is immediately replaced by another individual at the same terms and conditions. This implies that the principal is indifferent between keeping and firing the worker, and therefore will truthfully reveal his information. In the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model the agent faces a cost for dismissal because she must face a period of unemployment before finding a new position.
In contrast, it has been shown that under an optimal relational contract it is the agent, rather than the principal, who decides whether termination should occur. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) have already shown that efficiency wage contracts and the bonus contract used here yield the same outcome when subjective evaluations are perfectly correlated, and the agent is risk neutral. With a risk averse agent it is optimal for the amount of compensation to vary with the quality of the performance measure, while an efficiency wage entails a single wage level, and hence uses information less efficiently. This tilts the balance in favor of the performance pay contract.
This result might help explain a puzzle raised by Goetz and Scott (1981) regarding the extensive use of employment protection covenants, such as seniority rules in union contracts and institution of tenure for university professors, while the right of an individual to leave an employment relationship is protected.
Typically employers have the right to terminate employment of an individual during an initial screening period whose goal is to simply ensure that the individual is competent to carry out the task. Most contracts, and certainly most union contracts, give the employer the right to dismiss individuals when demand falls making continued employment economically infeasible, or for gross incompetence that might arise due to some change in an individual during the employment relationship.
Though employers have right to terminate employment in extreme cases, for many workers employment is assured as long as they continue to perform in a satisfactory manner. This might explain the recent trend in the law weakening the doctrine of at-will employment, particularly in cases where discrimination is suspected. 6 At the same time, the law protects an individuals right to leave a relationship, which the current model suggests may be an integral part of an optimal contract.
Concluding Discussion
This paper extends the standard principal-agent problem to allow for subjective measures of performance, and shows that, as in the standard principal-agent model, the optimal contract entails a compensation schedule that is increasing in the principal's subjective assessment of performance. Contracting costs are lower and the overall efficiency of the relationship enhanced if, in addition, the agent imposes a cost on the principal whenever she feels that the principal's assessment is "unfair". Moreover, contracting costs fall and performance increases when principal and agent have more highly correlated performance evaluations.
The model can explain why employee evaluations tend to be more compressed than the actual variation in performance. When the correlation between the principal's and agent's evaluations falls, then the cost 6 See Epstein (1984) for a review of these changes, and arguments why the doctrine should be maitained.
of conflict is reduced by compressing the pay-performance schedule, and in the limit when there is no correlation, evaluation is reduced to a two level system: acceptable performance or not. In practice firms often attempt to implement complex evaluation systems that finely discriminate between individuals, but then find that evaluators are reluctant to use such systems, particularly when the evaluators are taken from a peer group of employees (Milkovich and Newman (1996) ). If pay truly varies with subjective assessments, then employees have an incentive to ensure that the evaluations are fair, which necessarily entails some conflict when the inevitable differences in opinion arise. Moreover, these costly actions are more likely to be directed at one's direct supervisors or peers, further increasing the incentive for a compression of ratings.
It is not surprising therefore that management consultants, such as Edward Lawler III (2000), suggest that the number of levels used for discriminating between individuals in terms of performance be kept low.
7
When applied to the problem of discrimination in contract it is found that when there is a downward bias in the evaluations of the principal, this results in higher costs and lower performance. This complements the results in Coate and Loury (1993) who show that negative stereotypes cause individuals to invest less in human capital, and hence are less productive. Here the argument is more direct -given two identical individuals if the principal with the same information regarding performance believes that one is less likely to be productive, then that person will work less hard and earn less income. Moreover, if the agent is also more likely to disagree with a biased evaluation, this can lead to more conflict, higher costs, and even lower levels of performance.
The analysis highlights the trade-off between the use of high power incentives based upon subjective evaluation, and the "organizational" conflict that such systems create when the principle and agent have divergent beliefs regarding what constitutes acceptable performance. The optimal contract is structured in such a way that it is the principal's signal used to determine rewards, while the agent's self-evaluation of performance is used to determine whether or not a costly action should be carried out against the principal.
Thus in environments where subjective evaluation is more important, norms of fairness can also play an important role in triggering the agent's actions against the principal. This may also explain why a well defined "corporate culture" can enhance the performance of an organization. 7 See page 185 of Lawler III (2000) where he suggests that at most three levels of performance be used. 8 See Hermalin (1999) for a recent review of the literature. 9 A good example of the this is the famous Lincoln Electric case (Irrgang (1972) ). Not only is the company well known for the extensive use of perforamnce pay, but workers also report the sentiment that their efforts are fairly rewarded.
